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Utility versus Income-Based Altruism 
 
 





In Dictator Game experiments where the information status of the participants varies we find 
that a certain type of proposer tends to reduce his offers when the recipient has incomplete 
information about the pie size. We also find that a certain type of recipient tends to reject too 
small offers in the Impunity Game when the proposer has incomplete information about the 
recipient  type.  To  explain  these  puzzling  results  we  reconsider Becker’s  [1974] theory of 
altruism,  which  assumes  that  externalities  are  caused  by  other  people’s  utility.  When 
incomplete information about the other person is introduced, it turns out that his approach 
predicts – in contrast to other theories of altruism - that some altruistic persons will change 
their behavior as observed in our experiments. Thus, a kind of utility based altruism (and 
spite as its opposite form) can be assumed as the main principle governing behavior in this 
class of games. 
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1  Introduction 
Experimental  economists  agree  on  one  point:  the  narrow  self-interested  individual  utility 
function of payoff maximization accurately describes the behavior of human beings only in 
some occasions. When it comes to describing other, non-selfish behavior, the accord ends. 
Initial suggestions that altruistic behavior alone could be a principle motive were rejected by 
many experiments involving the Prisoners’ Dilemma (cf. e.g. Bolle and Ockenfels [1990]), 
and the Ultimatum Game (cf. e.g. Güth et al. [1996]). When decisions are embedded in a 
strategic setting, we observe choices different from altruistic (or egoistic) ones. On the one 
hand, it seems that in some games with more than one stage other motives (such as positive 
or negative reciprocity, induced envy or inequity aversion) override the altruistic feelings. On 
the other hand, altruism could be the baseline for co-operative behavior in other games with 
more than one stage, such as the Centipede Game (McKelvey and Palfrey [1992])).
2 
This  proves  that  altruism  is an  elusive  concept,  not only  in  theory  (as Simon  [1993] has 
highlighted) but also in experimental economics. One way to isolate altruistic motives from 
others  is  to  conduct  experiments  using  only  one-stage  games.  The  most  prominent 
experiment of this type is the Dictator Game. In this game Person A, the dictator, is able to 
decide how to share a pie between himself and Person B. Since the recipient is not able to 
react to the decision of the dictator, the dictator can be influenced by the recipient (if at all) 
only implicitly. Thus, the anonymously played Dictator Game can be seen as one test for 
‘pure’ altruistic motives, since Person A is able to express his preferences with respect to his 
willingness to reduce his own level of consumption in favor of Person B. 
The core results of Dictator Game experiments are that the average offer to the recipient 
varies between 20% and 25%, that approximately 1/3 of participants give (almost) nothing 
(less than 10%) while roughly two-thirds of the participants give more than 10% and up to 
50% of a pie of a $10 size (see e.g. Forsythe et al. [1994] which found support in later 
experiments by Hoffman et al. [1994], Camerer und Thaler [1995], Bolton und Zwick [1995], 
Eckel and Grossman [1996] Andreoni und Miller [2002] and Andreoni and Vesterlund [2001]). 
However,  the  behavior  noted  in  the  Dictator  Game  is  not  unanimously  interpreted.  An 
altruistic interpretation of these non-selfish choices is favored by Forsythe et al. [1994], Eckel 
and Grossman [1996], Andreoni and Vesterlund [2001], and others. Hoffman et al. [1994, 
1996]  were  the  first  to  doubt  that  such  a  high  share  of  participants  may  have  altruistic 
motives. To make sure that dictators were isolated in a way that there was no implicit social 
interaction, they conducted Dictator Game experiments with a double blind procedure. They 
(and later Johannesson and Persson [2000] in a similar experiment) found that not two-thirds 
                                                        
2 For an approach based on these experimental results, cf. Levine [1998] to which we will refer below. 
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but only about one-third of the subjects donate money under these special conditions. They 
interpreted  this  behavior as  “purely  altruistic“  suggesting  at  the  same  time  that the  other 
participants had made choices according to certain social norms.
3 
A different kind of objection to the experiments of Hoffman et al. [1994] was raised by Bolton 
and Zwick [1995] and Bolton et al. [1998]. They argued that in the experiment of Hoffman et 
al. [1994] the decreased willingness of the dictator to share the pie with the recipient did not 
result  from  the  increased  anonymity  but  from  the  differences  in  the  written  instructions 
(compared to the baseline experiment of Forsythe et al. [1994]). Bolton et al. [1998] further 
concluded that participants, when making their choices as dictators, “act first to secure what 
they consider to be their own fair share.“ Dictators do not behave in an altruistic but “in a self-
interested manner“ when they secure their own fair share. 
In this paper we aim to offer a different perspective. While previous research on the Dictator 
Game was mainly concerned with the subject-experimenter relation, we refocus attention on 
the  donator-recipient  relation.  We  will  use  the  typical  Dictator  Game  (as  determined  by 
Forsythe  et  al.  [1994])  as  a  benchmark  to  further  investigate  the  decisive  variables  of 
altruistic behavior, in particular why and how dictators, when deciding about their offer, might 
be implicitly influenced by the recipients even if the game is played in complete anonymity. 
Basically there are two different approaches to altruistic behavior, where the donator either 
aims to increase the income (cf. e.g. Collard [1978] and most other researchers) or the utility 
of the recipient (almost exclusively used by Becker [1974]). While in Section 2 of this paper 
we  argue  that  under  complete  information  it  is  difficult  to  discriminate  between  the  two 
approaches, Section 3 reveals that they have different implications in Dictator Games with 
incomplete information.  
In  Section  4  the  theoretical  findings  will  be  confronted  with  the  result  of  an  experiment 
inspired  by  Güth  and  Huck  [1997].  In  order  to  test  the  predictions  of  the  utility-based 
approach, we conducted two Dictator Games: one under complete, one under incomplete 
information. In the latter experiment, the dictator knows the size of the pie while the recipient 
knows only the probability distribution of the potential pie sizes. Those dictators who received 
large pies either offered the recipient a share relatively close to the equal split of the large pie 
(and, thus, revealed the true size of their pie) or they pretended to have received a small pie 
and offered the recipient half of the small pie or even less. This specific behavior can be 
explained only by altruism as deduced from the utility-based approach. 
                                                        
3 In reply to this experiment, Frohlich et al. [2001] suggested that in the increased anonymity setting 
the participants may have doubted that a recipient actually exists and therefore decreased the share 
transferred to their anonymous partner. For further contributions to this discussion cf. Bohnet and Frey 
[1999], Hoffman et al. [1999].   5 
Section 5 is devoted to a second test of this approach. Bolton and Zwick [1995] modified the 
Dictator  Game  where  the  recipient  could  reject  the  amount  he  received  by  the  dictator, 
whereas the dictator could keep his own share. This game, the ‘Impunity Game’, transforms 
the Dictator Game into a strategic game under incomplete information, in particular for the 
dictator.  We  conducted  the  Impunity  Game  and  compared  its  results  with  the  standard 
Dictator Game. We found out that, firstly, recipients were ready to decline positive offers if 
these  were  “too  small”,  and  that,  secondly,  those  Dictators  who  anticipated  potential 
rejections either decreased their transfer to zero or increased it above the amount where 
they expected a rejection. This behavior is explained again by a utility-based approach. 
2  Altruism under Complete Information 
In terms of utility theory, altruistic behavior is caused by external effects of "consumption". 
There are, as mentioned in section I, two competing approaches which differ in the origin of 
the  externalities.  In  most  approaches  on  altruism  it  is  assumed  that  a  person's  utility  is 
influenced by other persons' consumption of goods or by other persons' income. 
(1)  ( ), ,..., ,..., 1 n i i i x x x V U =  i=1,...,n, with xj = income (or consumption) of person j. 
where xi represents i’s consumption, and x1,..., xn represent the consumption of individuals j 
with whom altruist i interacts. Given (1), i’s utility is increased if j enjoys a higher income. 
Gary Becker [1974] has proposed a different utility-based setting: 
(2)  ( ) n i i i i i U U U U x U U ,... , ,... , 1 1 1 + - = , i=1,...,n. 
where U1,.. Ui-1, Ui+1,...,Un represents the utilities of individuals j with whom altruist i interacts. 
i’s utility is increased if j’s utility (j¹ i) is increased or i is ’happy’ if j is ’happy’. 
Both interpretations rely on positive derivatives, i.e. ∂Ui/∂xj>0 or ∂Ui/∂Uj>0. However, negative 
derivatives are possible, as well, where i is spiteful towards j so that i’s utility is increased 
when j faces a lower income or a lower utility, respectively. 
The income-based utility approach is mostly preferred for reasons of tractability. Equation (2) 
constitutes a system of equations which may be solved for Ui and then results in (1). As for 
(2), the utilities Uj are required to be somewhere between cardinal and absolute values (cf. 
Bolle [1985]); thus, it seems more appealing to start with (1). “Solving” the equations means 
that “equilibrium” values Uj* are determined where all persons have consistent expectations 
about the utilities of all others – a point which, in the next section, will prove to be of crucial 
importance when using the utility-based approach under incomplete information. 
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The first reason to support one of the two approaches can be deduced from the analysis of 
the emotional ties between persons. (2) describes the direct emotional link between persons 
(such as love or spite) depending on the sign of ∂Ui/∂Uj>0. (1) expresses the aggregation of 
all direct and indirect influences which may be described as altruism or malice, depending on 
the sign of ∂Ui/∂xj>0.  
The differing focus has consequences for indirect relationships. Under (2), i will help the 
friend of his friend (the enemy of his enemy) even if there is no direct relation to him.
4 Under 
(1), it is not possible to grasp indirect ties. Further, under (2), changes in one emotional 
relation between two members of a group will change all behavioral relationships between 
the relevant members. Under (1), again, no such consequence could be expected.
5 
The implication that one changing emotional relation in a group may influence the behavior 
within the whole group
6, is supported by psychologists and sociologists (cf. e.g. Granovetter 
[1973]), as well. Nevertheless, there seem to be no hard facts and no experiment clearly 
discriminating between  these  two  approaches. This  holds, however,  only  under  complete 
information which is implicitly assumed when (1) is derived from (2). 
The description of altruism in (2), however, is too general to be useful for the Dictator and the 
Impunity  Game,  the  main  focus  of  the  present  paper.  Therefore,  we  will  introduce  a 
specification of altruistic behavior, which is combined with recent research on equity theory 
and which fits into this class of two-person games.
7 In this class of games, Person 1 is able 
to distribute a pie of size p between the two, with x2 being transferred to Person 2 and x1 
being kept by himself (x1+x2=p). Consider the following utility functions: 
(3)  2 1
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1 1 U s
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(4)  1 2
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2 2 U s
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where we assume for simplicity’s sake that the individual’s utility is linearly increased in its 
own consumption, and where a and b are constant parameters of the two individuals. Based 
on recent research we further suppose that individuals have altruistic motives as long as their 
                                                        
4 If i’s friend's friend’s (i’s enemy's enemy's) utility is increased, then his friend's (enemy's) utility is 
increased (decreased), and thus i’s utility is increased. 
5 It should be mentioned that Becker's [1974] famous Rotten Kid Theorem depends fundamentally on 
his approach (see also Bergstrom [1989a, b]). At least one important condition of this theorem, namely 
that the utilities of all members of the family (of a group) are "superior goods" for the head, is rather 
difficult to be express in terms of (1). 
6 Note that Levine [1998] makes an ad-hoc assumption of this kind for his altruism function. 
7 Cf. in particular Fehr and Schmidt [1999] (FS) and Bolton and Ockenfels [2000] (BO).   7 
actual share xi of the pie p is higher than a certain minimum share of si.
8 By introducing the 
minimum fairness standard it also becomes possible to avoid an exogenous specification of 
the sign of  j i U U ¶ ¶ / . The derivations will be determined within the system where person i’s 
emotions may change into spite with the result that he is better off when Uj, j¹ i, decreases. 












































* ,  j ¹ i 
The  graphical  solution  of  (5)  is  given  in  Figure  1  for  two  persons.  The  result  of  (5) 
corresponds to the outcome under the income-based approach on altruism. 
-  insert Figure 1 about here – 
3  Altruism Under Incomplete Information 
While  in  the  usual  Dictator  Game  both  parties know  the  pie  size,  the  main focus  of the 
present  paper  is  on  a  setting  where  the  information  status  of  the  recipient  and  of  the 
proposer is varied. In this section, we will focus on the kind of behavior the two altruism 
concepts predict when the recipient has incomplete information about the pie size. 
One main feature distinguishing concepts on altruistic behavior from similar concepts is that 
altruistically-behaving individuals do explicitly consider the consequences of their choices (in 
the Dictator Game and elsewhere) for the recipient, while, for example, in fairness concepts 
(as  proposed  by  Bolton  et  al.  [1998]),  Dictators  are  assumed  to  consider  only  the 
consequences of their choices for themselves. Thus, on the one hand, altruistic concepts 
allow a more thorough analysis of human behavior. On the other hand, the fact that a person 
considers  the  consequences  of  his  choices  increases  the  analytical  requirements.  In 
particular, we need to consider what expectations each individual forms about the state of his 
fellow persons. Therefore, as a first step in analyzing the incomplete information approach, it 
is necessary to explain the formation of consistent expectations. 
                                                        
8 While FS and BO introduced very strong equity criteria in their models (the equal split was the main 
benchmark which made it particularly difficult to explain dictator behavior), in our model it is sufficient 
to impose a minimum requirement si. This modelling allows for further specifications of si, such as, for 
example, the introduction of an efficiency parameter where the minimum requirement decreases the 
more efficient a transfer is, i.e. the higher the transfer rate becomes (see Andreoni and Vesterlund 
[2001] and Kritikos and Bolle [2001]). 
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3.1 Formation of Consistent Expectations 
As we will see below, the problem of forming consistent expectations is fundamental to the 
utility-based approach.
9 We will restrict the analysis to a group of two persons
10 and will, to 
begin  with,  choose  a  very  simple  specification  of  the  utility  function  (2)  to  discuss  the 
implications when “consistent expectations” are introduced into our model: 
(6)  2 1 1 aU x U + =  
(7)  1 2 2 bU x U + =  
with constant parameters a and b. The main problem of the general approach of (2) as well 
as of (6) and (7) is that person 1 does not know U2 and person 2 does not know U1. Rather, 
they have to form expectations (E2U1, E1U2) about the other’s utility. Therefore, to cope with 
the problem, (6) and (7) have to be modified as follows: 
(8)  a x U + = 1 1 E1U2 
(9)  + = 2 2 x U bE2U1 
Thus, 







2 1  







1 2  
Under complete information, (E1U2, E2U1) are called consistent expectations if U1 = E1U2,  
U2 = E2U1 fulfils (8) and (9). 
For this specification of the utility function, E1U2 and E2U1 can be the result of an adjustment 
process only if  . 1 < ab  A graphical solution of (8) and (9) is shown in Figure 1. 
Using the same specification under incomplete information, we now assume that a and x1 are 
private  information  of  person  1.
11  Person  2  knows  the  distributions  of  these  values.  In 
                                                        
9 Incomplete information in Approaches of (1) constitutes no problem. It is possible to consider  i iV E , 
i.e. i’s expected value of  i V  (from the viewpoint of i – therefore  i E ), as the decisive utility. At the same 
time  i V  is assumed to measure i’s risk aversion, as well. 
10 The general problem of coping with incomplete information in the utility-based approach requires a 
separate model. This paper merely aims to show that such an endeavor is worthwhile as this 
approach is capable of explaining phenomena which cannot be captured by other approaches. 
11 With a being unknown or variable, (10) and (11) do no longer coincide with approach (1). Now U2 
depends on a parameter of 1’s utility function. See also Levine [1998] for a similar approach.   9 
addition, person 1 knows the information status of 2, i.e. he knows her distribution of a and x1 
and she knows the function which determines U1. Similarly, b and x2 are private information 
of person 2. Thus, both persons know the function by which utilities are formed. Thus, person 
1 does not know which utility U2 person 2 really enjoys, but it is assumed that he derives a 
consistent  expectation  value  E1U2  determining  the  utility  of  person  1.  Under  incomplete 
information,  j U  is not necessarily equal to EjUj. Consistent expectations now require that 
there are given expectations E1U2 that person 2 considers when forming her expectation, i.e.  
(12)  2 1 2 1 2 1 2 U E a E x E U E × + = , 
and that person 1 considers given expectations E2U1 when forming his expectations, i.e.  
(13)  1 2 1 2 1 2 1 U E b E x E U E × + = . 
Since  b x a x E 1 2 1 2 1 2 E   and   , E   , E   ,  are common knowledge it is possible to solve (12) and (13) for 
1 2 2 1   and   U E U E  which leads to 
(14) 
b E a E
x E a E x E
U E
1 2
2 1 2 1 2




b E a E
x E b E x E
U E
1 2
1 2 1 2 1
2 1 1 × -
× +
= . 
The utilities which 1 and 2 really enjoy are calculated by substituting E1U2 and E2U1 in (8), (9) 
by means of (14) and (15). 
It is important to highlight differences and similarities between EjUi and “usual” expectation 
values as, for example, Eixj. On the one hand, the consistent expectations EjUi are solutions 
of a system of equations and, thus, different from expectation values of a certain distribution. 
On the other hand, under incomplete information, the two concepts have similarities. The 
requirement that Person i takes into account his knowledge about Person j’s utility, i.e. (8) 
and (9) in the above example, makes Ui a random variable (from j’s point of view) and EjUi 
also a usual expectation value.
12 
3.2 A Simple Model of Utility-Based Altruism Under Incomplete Information 
Having introduced consistent expectations under incomplete information we may apply these 
expectations to the specification of (3) the utility function which we will use for all kind of 
Dictator Games. For this class of games, it is assumed now that the dictator does not know 
                                                        
12 In particular under incomplete information, the EjUi have certain similarities to consistent beliefs in 
Sequential Equilibria (cf. Kreps and Wilson [1982]). Consistent means in both cases that expectations 
(beliefs) are suited to each other and to the objective problem. 
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s2,  the  recipient’s  standard  of  justice.  The  recipient  does  not  know  p  and  s1.  Both  have 
information  about  the  respective  distributions  which  describe  the  other’s  incomplete 
information. a and b are assumed to be common knowledge. 
In order to apply our approach of consistent expectations to this class of games with the 
information status given above, a further factor complicating the utility based approach has to 
be mentioned: j has to consider a random variable zUi consisting of the random variable z 
(the  distribution  of  which  is  common  knowledge)  and  Ui  about  which  j  has  to  develop 
consistent  expectations.  In  the  line  of  our  approach  we  therefore  assume  that  j  has  to 
develop consistent expectations about Ui and about zUi. Instead of (4), the recipient’s utility 
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p
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Based on (3), the dictator’s utility under incomplete information is described by 
(17)  2 1 1
1
1 1 U E s
p
x






- + = . 





2 , and E1U2 are also conditional 
expectations, namely under the condition that person 1 has transferred x2 to person 2.  
Considering (17) from the dictator’s point of view leads to 
(18)  1 2 2 1
1
2 2 2 2 1 U E s bE
p
U
E bx x U E - + = . 
Regarding (18) from the viewpoint of the recipient yields 
(19)  ( ) 2 1 1 2
2
2 2 2 1 2 U E s E
p
x p








+ - = . 
Finally, we divide (18) by p and then form the expectation from the recipient’s viewpoint: 
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2   since  all  other  values  are  common 
knowledge. Inserting these values in (16) and (17) reveals the utilities which recipient and 
dictator enjoy. Since only the dictator makes a decision we focus on his utility: 
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where E2 denotes the recipient’s conditional expectation having received x2. Under certainty, 
(21)  is  equal  to  (8).  The  dictator  chooses  x2  such  that  (21)  is  maximized.  A  numerical 
example showing that there is a solution as described in this section is given in Appendix B. 
4  A Dictator Experiment with an Uninformed Recipient 
Having shown the implications of incomplete information for the utility-based approach on 
altruism  we  turn  now  to  the  experiment  which  focuses  on  the  Dictator  Game  where  the 
information status of the recipient is varied according to the manner described above. In the 
usual Dictator Game under complete information, Person 1 (the dictator) is endowed with a 
known amount of money which he can divide arbitrarily between himself and Person 2 (the 
recipient). In the present experiment the Dictator Game is varied insofar as the dictator is 
endowed with an amount p which is not known to the recipient. She only knows that  S p p =  
with probability a  and  L p p = , with  a - 1 , and she knows  L S p p < .
13 
4.1 Analysis 
Under the income-based approach – whatever the specification of (1) is – the dictator is 
expected  to  offer  the  recipient  the  same  amount  x2  and  keep  x1  =  p  -  x2  for  himself, 
irrespective of the recipient’s information status about the pie size p. 
If the utility-based approach is applied, the dictator is expected to care about the recipient's 
beliefs on  1 x  and about her utility parameters. (18) implies that the dictator wants U2 to be as 
                                                        
13 Güth and Huck [1997] (which inspired the present experimental setting) conducted a similar 
experiment where the recipient had incomplete information about the pie size. In contrast to the 
present experiment, they used the strategy method and had no control setting under complete 
information. For these and for various other reasons, it was not possible to use their data for our test. 
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large  as  possible,  provided  he  himself  gets  a  share  x1/p>s1.  (17)  implies  that  this  goal 
requires the recipient to assume p to be small. (For a numerical example see Appendix B) 
Experience  from  previous  Dictator  Game  experiments  implies  that  the  recipient  has 
expectations  about  the  transfer  x2  she  would  receive  under  complete  information.  It  is 
reasonable to assume that she expects no dictator to give more than half of his endowment. 
By giving more than ps/2 the dictator would uncover that he has  L p p = . By proposing less 
than ps/2 he can make the recipient believe that  s p p = , as we will see below, at least with a 
probability  a a ³
' . 
Given that the distribution of p, s1 and s2 are common knowledge, it is plausible to expect the 
dictators, if endowed with a large pie  L p , to decide as follows: First, there may be a fraction 
b  of dictators who will transfer more than  2 / S p , indicating that they were endowed with  L p . 
Since they are ready to reveal their type, they will give the same amount as under complete 
information. It makes sense to assume (supported by the subsequent analysis) that the  b –
fraction of dictators are those types who give most under complete information. Of course, 
b  is not exogenously given but determined by the analysis of the situation. 
Second,  there  is  a  fraction  b - 1 of  dictators  who  received  a  large  pie  and  would  have 
proposed not much more than  2 / S p  under complete information. This fraction may increase 
his  utility  by  reducing  2 x   below  2 / S p .  Since  we are  more  interested  into  the  qualitative 
reasoning, we will make the subsequent plausibility analysis (for the exact updating process 
see Appendix C) by using (16) and (17): If dictators anticipate that the recipient's utility can 
be increased by making her believe (with a certain probability) that there is only a small pie, 





2  could be induced by a small reduction of x2 (if U1 is about the same from the recipients 
point of view). Hence, U2 and, consequently, U1 will be increased. On the other hand,  1 x  and 
2 x  do not correspond anymore to their optimal values under complete information.  
This makes it possible to distinguish between those who reveal the true size of their pie and 
those who hide behind the small pie. Those dictators (who would have given more than half 
of the small pie in the complete information setting) will now have to compare the ‘indirect’ 
utility increase of U2 from reducing their transfer to an amount less than half the small pie 
with  the  ‘direct’  utility  decrease from  reducing  their transfer  below  the optimal  level.  It  is 
reasonable to expect that the ‘direct’ utility decrease is higher the more  2 x  has to be reduced 
under incomplete information in comparison to the optimal  2 x  under complete information. 
This reasoning, however, still leaves open how much dictators pretending to have received 
the small pie are expected to propose. Under complete information, it would be optimal to 
offer  2 / 1 S p x > , under incomplete information the dictator would like to reduce his proposal   13 
as little as possible. According to the analysis he would prefer to transfer an amount exactly 
equal  to  2 / S p   or  just  below  2 / S p .  Yet,  if  the  recipient,  in  her  updating  process  of  the 
distribution of p does not only note whether  2 / 2 S p x £ , but also takes into account the exact 
amount of  2 x , then  2 / 2 S p x =  will make her “distrustful”. Therefore, an extended analysis 
with a more sophisticated updating process should show that not necessarily all types of 
dictators would propose an amount of approximately  2 / 2 S p x = , but that every type may 
have a personal optimum. Of course, the dictator can hide his large pie only if there are 
dictators who would offer the same amount x2 when endowed with a small pie. 
Those  dictators  with  L p   who  are  also  among  the  “ b - 1 fraction”  and  who  would  offer 
2 / 2 S p x <  even under complete information will, since E2p is reduced, further reduce  2 x , as 
well. In contrast to this, dictators who are endowed with a small amount  S p  will suffer from 
the incomplete information situation and from the updating procedure of the recipients. It can 
be expected that they will increase  2 x  (compared to the complete information situation) to 
compensate for the increased  1
~ x . 
Conclusion  1:  In  comparing  Dictator  Game  experiments  with  complete  and  incomplete 
information,  the  following  expectations  can  be  deduced:  The  Utility-based  approach 
predicts for dictators endowed with  L p  three different behavioral patterns. First, there are 
dictators who offer a relatively large share (up to the equal split) under complete information 
and who are expected not to change behavior under incomplete information. The second 
type are those dictators who give not much more than  2 / S p  and the third type those who 
give less than  2 / S p  under complete information. Under incomplete information the second 
type will propose less (but close to)  2 / S p , and the third type will further reduce their offer 
(partly to zero). (See Figure 2, bold curve.) For more differentiated types of dictators the 
described monotone matching of types and contributions may be less strict. The expected 
behavioral changes should show the same, but less extreme tendency. Furthermore, for a 
dictator endowed with  S p , the utility-based approach predicts that offers are increased. 
-  insert Figure 2 about here – 
4.2. Experimental Design and Procedure 
DESIGN: The present experiment encompassed two different treatments, the basic Dictator 
Game (Game 1) and the Dictator Game under asymmetric information (Game 2). The basic 
Dictator Game aimed to confirm previous results and to serve as a baseline treatment for 
comparison with Game 2. In both treatments, a dictator was anonymously matched with a 
recipient. The dictator received an endowment of either pL=10 Euro or pS=1.15 Euro.
14 In 
                                                        
14 The experiment was conducted in November 2001 using German currency. Thus, the pie size was 
then 19.55 DM for the large and 2.25 DM for the small pie. Therefore, no prominence effects could 
occur in the experiment. 
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Game 1 the recipient knew the endowment of the dictator. Game 2 differed from Game 1 
only in one variable: the recipient did not know the exact size of the endowment but was 
informed that the dictator received a large pie of 10 Euro with probability a=⅔ and a small pie 
of 1.15 Euro with probability ⅓. All other variables were kept constant in both games (for the 
Instructions see Appendix A). 
ORGANIZATION:  240  undergraduates  from  our  University  participated  in  this  part  of  the 
experiment - 120 in each session. They were recruited through announcements in lectures. 
Participation required appearance at a prearranged place and time and was restricted to one 
session. Upon arrival participants were randomly assigned to their roles as dictator (Person 
A) or recipient (Person B). In both treatments 40 dictators were endowed with the large and 
20 with the small pie. Throughout the sessions participants were placed in separate rooms. 
All experiments were conducted once, after the participants had received written and verbal 
instructions about the setting. All participants were randomly and anonymously matched. 
PROTOCOL:  In  each  session  all  dictators  received  an  envelope  containing  the  written 
instructions and the amount of the pie, split into many coins enabling the dictator to propose 
any amount to the recipient he preferred. The written instructions used the same script for 
both treatments with the only modification that in Game 1 the recipient was informed about 
the size of the pie the dictator had received and that in Game 2 the recipient was informed 
about the probability distribution with which the dictator had received either one of the two 
pies. To ensure complete privacy for the decision, cubicles were offered. The dictators put 
the amount devoted to the recipient back into the envelope, put the envelope into a box 
where all proposals were collected and pocketed their own share of the pie. The box was 
then  transferred  to  room  B  and  randomly  distributed  to  the  recipients  after  two  neutral 
persons  had  registered  the  amount  in  each  envelope  in  a  third  room.  Thus,  it  was  not 
possible to attribute any individual action to individual subjects. 
REMARK ON THE ANALYSIS OF BEHAVIOR: When the experiment was designed it became clear 
that the smaller the small pie was in the incomplete information setting the easier it became 
to discriminate between the behavior of those dictators in the two treatments who received 
the large pie. At the same time, the smaller the small pie, the less it became possible to 
discriminate  between behavior  of  those dictators  in  the  two treatments  who  received  the 
small pie. Since we decided that the decisions of dictators who received the large pie are 
more important, we chose the small pie to be ‘very small’ with 1,15 Euro. Accordingly, we will 
restrict the analysis to those dictators who received the large pie and will only make some 
remarks on the behavior of the dictators who received the small pie.   15 
4.3. Predictions 
Starting with the unique ‘egoistic’ equilibrium prediction, the dictator would make no positive 
offer to the recipient no matter how the recipient is informed about the pie size the dictator 
received. Application of the income-based approach on altruism is straightforward as well. It 
results  in  (H0),  the  distribution  of  the dictator  proposals  should be  the  same  under  both 
conditions, irrespective of the information status of the recipients. 
Application of the utility-based approach on altruism leads to the following hypotheses given 
the parameters of small and large pie and given the theoretical results presented in Figure 2. 
In comparison to Game 1, among those who received the large pie in Game 2 (where the 
recipient has incomplete information), we expect that 
H1)  the average transfer x2 of the dictators will decrease. 
H2)  more subjects will offer nothing or less than 0.6 Euro (about half the small pie), 
H3)   less subjects will offer amounts between 0.6 Euro and 2.5 Euro (about one quarter of 
the large pie and the modal offer in Game1), 
H4)   about the same number of subjects will offer between 2.5 and 5 Euro. 
With respect to the separation between those Dictators who reveal and those who do not 
reveal the true size of the pie we did not optimize x2. Instead we decided to separate those 
types of Dictators by arguing that subjects who transfer significantly more than the average 
type  in  the  complete  information  game  are  also  willing  to  reveal  their  true  size  in  the 
incomplete information game by transferring the same amount. More specifically, we chose 
x2=2.5 Euro as a crucial amount to distinguish between these two types. 
4.4. Experimental Results 
In  a  first  step  we  compare  the  data  of  the  present  €10  Dictator  Game  under  complete 
information with the $10 Dictator Game experiment of Forsythe et al. [1994, p. 366] - which 
served as a baseline treatment in previous studies. The distribution of proposals and the 
average  payoff  (22.3%  in  the  Forsythe  et  al.  and  20.4%  in  the  present  experiment)  are 
similar.
15 (No significant difference by the Mann-Whitney U test, p=0.2912). This indicates 
that the behavior of the present ‘population’ is comparable with earlier observations. 
The analysis of the present study focuses on the comparison of the dictator’s willingness to 
transfer a certain share of his pie to the recipient when the information status of the recipient 
is varied. Starting with hypothesis H1, the average offer, dictators who had received the €10 
pie in Game 2 proposed on average 11,4% of the pie, half of what dictators offered under 
                                                        
15 For various reasons we gave to the subjects smaller units than in most earlier experiments. 
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complete information in Game 1 (20,4%). (An overview of all offers in the two games is given 
in  Table  1.)  A  Kolmogorov-Smirnov  Test  verifies  in  favor  of  H1  that  the  distribution  of 
proposals is significantly lower in Game 1 than in Game 2 (p<0.01). H0 can be rejected. 
With respect to the three hypotheses H2 to H4, we have ordered in Figure 3 the results of 
Games 1 and 2 in a way that the hypotheses can be tested. Proceeding with H2 the share of 
participants who made proposals between nothing and half the small pie, we observe an 
increase from 23% to 60% in the asymmetric information game (in support of H2, Fisher’s 
probability test shows p=0.017). This observation indicates that many participants tried to 
signal to the recipient that they had received the small instead of the large pie. Moreover, the 
high share of subjects giving even less than half the small pie supports our approach in two 
ways: not only subjects who had given less than half of the small pie in game 1 reduced their 
offers further to (almost) zero, but also participants who had given slightly more than pS/2 
reduced their offers to an individually calculated optimum which was not equal to pS/2. 
Figure 3 also provides answers to the two further hypotheses: In (H3) we hypothesized a 
sharp decrease of offers in the range between 0.6 and 2.5 Euro. Our data suggest this to be 
true since there were only 17% in Game 2 – as opposed to 47% in Game 1 – who offered an 
amount between 60 cents and 2.50 Euro (in support of H2, p=0.005). 
Coming to the final hypothesis (H4) it was asserted that dictators who transfer a relatively 
high  share  of  the  large  pie  under  complete  information  would  do  the  same  thing  under 
asymmetric information because this type of dictator is ready signal the size ofhis large pie. 
Since he is willing to sacrifice more than the average offer he expects the recipient to be 
content with his proposal. In Game 1 the share of dictators of this type was 30%, in Game 2 
it was 23%, showing no significant difference (p=0.3) between the settings. 
A final remark should be made about the small pie under incomplete information. Due to the 
small size of the small pie we did not expect significant differences in behavior between 
persons in both settings and the experimental results showed that the decisions were indeed 
nearly the same. However, it is interesting to note that dictators endowed with a small pie in 
the incomplete information game transferred either nothing or less than € 0.6, confirming our 
argument in case of a large pie: It was necessary for dictators who were endowed with a 
large pie and who wanted to pretend having a small pie to give less than € 0.6. 
Result  1:  We  observe  significant  changes  in  dictator  behavior  once  the  recipient  has 
incomplete information. Only those dictators who offered more than average under complete 
information behave in the same way when the recipient does not know their pie size. They 
expect the increase of the recipient’s utility to be sufficient even if they reveal the size of their 
pie. Dictators making average offers or less in the complete information setting, reduced their 
offers to half of the small pie or even less under incomplete information.   17 
5  The Impunity Game 
In this section, we further test the two approaches by focusing on another variation of the 
Dictator Game, the Impunity Game (by Bolton and Zwick [1995]). In the Impunity Game the 
dictator is again endowed with known amount of money which he may divide between the 
recipient  and  himself.  The  recipient  is  given  the  choice  to  either  accept  or  decline  the 
dictator’s offer. In the latter case x2 is lost and not given back to the dictator. The dictator, 
however, can keep his own share x1 irrespective of the choice of the recipient.
16 
5.1 Analysis 
Dictators, when deciding about x2, expect to be confronted not only with a single type of 
recipient but with a distribution of types. Thus, they have to deal with incomplete information 
about the final income and the utility of their recipient. When dictators are informed about the 
rejection or acceptance of their proposal there is a clear difference between the income-
based  and  the  utility-based  approach.  Under  the  income-based  approach,  no  recipient 
should reject any offer x2. Under the utility-based approach, there might be recipients who 
reject small offers.
17 In order to make this plausible, we use the utilities of (16) and (17). 
Let us assume that there is a fraction  ( ) 2 x b  of recipients who accept the offer x2, and let 
( ) 2 2
~ x s  be the conditional expectation of the dictator about s2 based on those recipients who 
do accept the offer x2.  2 ˆ s (x2) is the conditional expectation based on those recipients who 
reject the offer.  ) ( ~
2 1 x s  describes the recipient’s conditional expectation after receiving x2. It is 
a  plausible  assumption  that  b ,  2 2 s ˆ   and   , ~ s   are  increasing  functions  of  x2  while  ) ( ~
2 1 x s   is 
decreasing. If the dictator uses a pure monotone strategy the recipient is able to determine s1 
exactly from the transfer x2, i.e.  ( ) 1 2 1
~ s x s = . Under these conditions we look for consistent 
expectation values E1U2 and E2U1 determining the utilities of the dictator and the recipient. 
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2 = = x x  (if the recipient rejects the offer). 
                                                        
16 Bolton and Zwick [1995] made a binary choice experiment which does not allow to analyze the 
recipient’s behavior in our sense. The same holds for the experiments of Güth and Huck [1997] who 
used the strategy method. Both designs do not fit in with the requirements of the present approach 
and in both experiments the dictators probably were not informed about the choice of the recipient. For 
a similar experiment close to the Impunity Game, see also Fellner and Gueth [2002]. 
17 It is crucial for the analysis that dictators are informed about the recipient’s choice. Otherwise, if 
transfers are rejected without dictators being informed, additional motives must be considered. 
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(22) and (23) serve for plausibility arguments which show that a certain rate of rejections by 
recipients  is  probable.  A  rigorous  derivation  of  some  properties  of  the  subgame  perfect 
equilibrium of the game between the dictator and the recipient is given in Appendix C. 
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“more  negative”,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  plausible  that  U1  and  therefore  also  E2U1 
decreases: After the rejection of the transfer, the dictator is informed that the recipient has a 
high  parameter  s2  and  that  therefore  E1U2  is  negative.  This  updating  of  the  dictator’s 
expectations about the recipient’s type is the decisive reason why the recipient rejects the 
offer. The last argument also shows why the dictator did not give more: He optimized his gift 
with respect to an average s2, taking into account that some recipients would reject his gift. 
Conclusion  2:  In  the  Impunity  Game  some  rejections  must  be  expected.  In  addition, 
dictators will behave differently when recipients are able to reject their transfer. We expect 
the  following  dichotomous  decision.  From  standard  dictator  experiments  it  is  known  that 
many dictators transfer relatively small amounts to their recipients. If these small transfers 
are  rejected,  the  dictator’s  utility  is  decreased.  Under  these  circumstances,  dictators  are 
better off if they either make no transfers at all (i.e. x2=0), or if they increase the transfers. 
5.2 Experimental Design and Procedure 
DESIGN: The experiment described in section 4.2 was continued in the same way. In the 
Impunity  Game  (Game  3)  the  Dictator  received  again  a  pie  of  10  Euro  for  distribution 
between him and an anonymous recipient. The recipient had the choice between accepting 
and rejecting the transfer of the dictator and the dictator was informed about the decision of 
the recipient. The dictator could always keep the his own share of the pie irrespective of the 
recipient. The recipient’s share was lost for both if he rejected it. All other variables were kept 
constant in comparison to Game 1 (for Instructions see Appendix A). 
ORGANIZATION: In this part of the experiment 100 undergraduates from the same University 
took  part – 50  were  randomly  assigned  to  their  roles as dictators  (Person  A) and 50  as 
recipients (Person B). The rest of the organization was kept identical – see section 4.2. 
PROTOCOL: The protocol was also kept as much similar as possible to the first part of the 
experiment. In order to be able to inform the dictator about the decision of the recipient, the 
dictator received in addition to the instructions a second note where he had to write down a 
pseudonym. (On the note, the recipient then had to state his choice of either “offer accepted” 
or  “offer  rejected”).  Together  with  his  decision  how  much  money  he  transferred  to  the   19 
recipient, the dictator had to put the note with his pseudonym into the envelope, as well. The 
envelopes  were  collected  and  distributed  in  the  same  way  as  in  the  first  part  of  the 
experiment. Recipients either collected the transfer and chose on the note “offer accepted” or 
rejected the transfer (left the money in the envelope – if any was inside) and stated “offer 
rejected”. Then all envelopes were put into the box by the recipients and the box was brought 
to  the  room  of  the  dictators.  All  decisions  were  read  aloud  to  the  dictators  stating  the 
pseudonym of each dictator and the decision of the recipient. 
5.3 Predictions 
The income-based approach on altruism expects that in the Impunity Game the dictators 
again  make  the  same  proposals  as  in  the  Dictator  Game  and  that  recipients  accept  all 
positive transfers (H0’). The utility-based approach expects that 
H5)   recipients will reject positive offers up to a certain amount. 
Section 5.1 also allows for the further hypotheses that - compared to Game 1 - in Game 3 
H6)  a higher share of zero transfers, and 
H7)   a lower share of small transfers, 
H8)  a higher share of high transfers will appear. 
5.4 Experimental Results 
In the Impunity Game, we observed an average transfer of 22.2%, virtually the same amount 
as in the standard Dictator Games of e.g. Forsythe [1994] or of the present experiment, while 
the standard deviation was 1.63 in the standard Dictator Game and 3.34 in the Impunity 
Game. To find out whether the distribution of payoffs are different we run a Levene Test for 
equality of variances which showed that the variances of offers were different in the two 
games (p=0.038) showing first support for H6 to H8. 
However, let us begin with hypothesis 5. Out of the 50 offers in Game 3, there were in total 6 
rejections (significantly different from zero, p=0.013). Recipients rejected all (five) positive 
offers less than 10% of the pie size – i.e. of less than 1 Euro and there was one rejection on 
a 1 Euro offer. This shows that recipients did not reckon with the crumb of a pie. 
With respect to hypotheses H6 to H8 we present the list of all offers in Table 1. According to 
our hypotheses, we subdivided (see Figure 4) these observations into four classes of offers, 
no offer, offers of less than 2 Euro, offers between 2 Euro and 4.5 Euro and offers of up to 5 
Euro. As Figure 4 shows, in support of H6, 26% of the participants decided to make no 
transfer at all, significantly more than in our standard Dictator Game (p=0.046). In support of 
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H7 (p=0.01) offers of less than 2 Euro where only observed in 16% of the cases while in the 
standard  Dictator  Game  most  offers  were  in  this  class  (42.5%). With  respect  to  the  last 
hypothesis (H8), we conjecture that all participants who aimed to make sure that the recipient 
will be ‘happy’ with the transfer put ‘some more’ money into the envelope, with the result that 
in the medium range of transfers (between 2 Euro and 4.5 Euro) we observe merely the 
same frequency while at the high end of transfers (around 5 Euro) there were significantly 
more transfers in the Impunity Game (p=0.06) than in the standard Dictator Game. 
Result 2: We observe significant changes in dictator behavior once the recipient is able to 
reject his own share of the pie (which the dictator has transferred to him). Only a small share 
of Dictators make positive transfers of less than 20% in the Impunity Game and most of 
these transfers are rejected. The majority of dictators either decide to keep all the pie or to 
offer sufficiently higher amounts to make sure that the recipient is satisfied with his share. 
6  Summary 
The present experiments compared the willingness of dictators to make offers to anonymous 
recipients when the information status of the dictator or of the recipients was varied. In the 
baseline  treatment  where  both  were  fully  informed,  dictators  gave  similar  amounts  as  in 
previous studies. In the second treatment where the recipient was only informed about the 
probability distribution of the pie sizes, dictators still gave non-trivial amounts, but some of 
them  significantly  reduced  their  transfers.  Using  the  complete  information  treatment  we 
differentiated  between  three  types  of  dictators:  Dictators  who  keep  the  complete  pie  for 
themselves, dictators who transfer less than or the average offer and dictators who offer 
more than average (up to the equal split of the pie). Having received the large pie, the first 
and the third type of Dictators did not change their behavior under incomplete information. 
The second type, however, preferred to hide their true endowment by reducing the offer: 
They induced the recipient to believe that he had received a considerable amount of the 
small pie instead of a small amount of the large pie. 
This type of dictator did so for good reasons, since he aims to make the recipient ‘happy’ by 
signalling generosity. As our experiment on the Impunity Game revealed, some recipients 
were indeed ‘unhappy’ about the suggested split of the pie. Most positive offers of less than 
20% were rejected. Using the same typing of dictators, if the second type (who would have 
transferred less than average in the Dictator Game) anticipated rejections in the Impunity 
Game, he either refrained at all from trying to make the recipient happy and kept the whole 
pie or made sure that the recipient will feel happy by making higher transfers. 
The utility-based approach on altruism (as suggested by Becker [1974]) is able to give a 
thorough explanation of the observed behavior. Since dictators may have anticipated that   21 
recipients  have  a  ‘spite’  component  in  their  utility  functions,  in  the  Dictator  Game  with 
incomplete information they may propose offers which could be interpreted as considerable 
amounts of the pie, whatever its size. Thereby, dictators expect to increase the recipients’ 
utility (and, thus, their own utility) more than by revealing the true size of their pie. Yet, having 
determined  the  borderline between altruism and  spite  within  the  system,  the  utility-based 
approach is also consistent with the empirical evidence on the Impunity Game where the 
recipients  can  explicitly  express  the  spite  component  in  their  utility  function  and  where 
dictators either stop any transfer or increase the offer to an amount which can be regarded – 
again – as considerable in order to avoid any utility reduction by a rejection. 
Our results have consequences for newer descriptive theories which aim to capture human 
behavior beyond the narrow self-interest. A major topic in the discussion of how to model this 
behavior was whether – as Bolton et al. [1998] formulated – dictators make offers “in order to 
improve the welfare of others” or to “secure what they consider to be their own fair share.” A 
main insight of our analysis is that dictators were not only interested in the fair share from 
their own point of view but that they also considered the recipient’s position: they explicitly 
decided in an altruistic way. This does not mean that equity-oriented approaches have no 
explanation. Rather, to the contrary, having introduced minimum standards of fairness as a 
means  to  determine  the  borderline  between  altruism  and  spite,  it  became  possible  to 
combine  two  approaches  which  have  previously  been  used  in  a  contradicting  way.  This 
approach on altruism (which traces back to Becker [1974]) is able to explain a wider range of 
behavior in the class of Dictator Games.
18 Thus, we believe that our interpretation of the 
utility-based approach should be further tested in other social situations in and outside
19 the 
lab where our approach places a lower bound of altruistic behavior. 
                                                        
18 Levine [1998] e.g. explains behavior in the Centipede Game, in Public Goods Games, and in market 
games with a utility function similar to (10) which again may be based on Becker [1974]. 
19 A first example of similar behavior outside the lab is given, when the bequest of two children needs 
to be determined. Stark and Zhang [2002, p. 21] argue: “Parents who are equally altruistic towards 
their children may consider leaving a larger bequest to the lower-earning child 2 (a “compensation” 
act). However, because the division of bequests is public information, unequal division is tantamount 
to a public statement that child 2’s earnings are relatively low – a declaration that can embarrass child 
2.” This argument is in line with the utility-based approach on altruism. 
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Figure 3:  Cumulative Results of Dictator Offers in Game 1 and Game 2 (according to Hypotheses 2 through 4) 
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Dictator Offer in      Game 1       Game 2    Game 3 
0.00  4  11  13 
0.10  --  3  -- 
0.16  1  --  -- 
0.26  --  2  -- 
0.31  1  --  -- 
0.42  --  1  1 
0.52  1  2  1 
0.57  2        5  -- 
0.62  2  1  3 
0.94  --  1  -- 
1.00  1  --  1 
1.04  --  1  2 
1.15  6  4  -- 
1.67  3  --  -- 
2.00  --  --  3 
2.08  1  --  1 
2.19  6  --  6 
2.54  --  1  -- 
2.59  1  --  1 
2.66  --  2  -- 
2.92  --  1  -- 
3.00  --  --  2 
3.23  2  --  1 
3.65  1  --  1 
3.75  --  1  -- 
4.00  1  --  -- 
4.27  1  --  -- 
4.48  --  1  -- 
4.50  1  --  -- 
4.69  --  --  1 
4.74  --  1  -- 
4.80  2  2  6 
5.00  3  --  7 
 
Table 1: Offers of Dictators in Game 1 (Dictator Game with complete information), Game 2 
(Dictator Game with incomplete information) and Game 3 (Impunity Game) 
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Appendix A: Instructions to the players in the Dictator Experiment  
In the description the instructions for player A are presented. Differences corresponding to 
the three treatments are indicated in boldface. For the instructions of Person B the obvious 
changes were made. 
Instructions For Player A 
You  have  been  asked  to  participate  in  an  economics  experiment  on  individual  decision 
making. For your participation you may earn some money which will be paid to you right 
away. Before you make any decision please read carefully the following instructions. If you 
have any questions, don’t hesitate to ask the experimenter. 
In this experiment each of you will be paired with a different person who is in another room. 
This is room A and you are Person A. The person who will be paired with you is Person B in 
Room B. You will not be told who these people in Room B are, neither during nor after the 
experiment, and they will not be told who you in Room A are, neither during nor after the 
experiment. You will notice that there are other people in the same room with you who are 
also participating in the experiment. You will not be paired with any of these people. The 
decisions that they make will have absolutely no effect on you nor will any of your decisions 
affect them. The experiment is conducted as follows: A sum of DM 19.55 (DM 2.25) has 
been allocated to you in coins in the envelope. 
Game 1 and Game 3: The person B who is matched with you knows that you have received 
this amount. You are now asked to propose how much of this each person is to receive. You 
are free to propose any amount you like to person B: nothing, something or the whole sum. 
Game 3 (in addition): Person B in room B may accept or reject your proposal. If person B 
accepts your proposal, both of you will pocket the respective amount. If person B rejects your 
proposal, you will keep your own share of the pie and person B receives no payoff. At the 
end of the session you will be informed about the decision of B, by using your pseudonym. 
Game 2: There are 39 (40) more players who have received DM 19.55 and 20 (19) more 
players who received DM 2.25. Person B who is paired with you does not know the exact 
amount allocated to you. Person B knows that you have received DM 2.25 with a probability 
of 33.3% and DM 19.55 with a prob. of 66.7%. You are asked to propose how much of the 
amount  of  DM  19.55  (DM  2.25) each person  is  to  receive.  You are free  to propose  any 
amount you like to person B: nothing, something or the complete sum. 
For your decision you may use the cubicles in the room. You will have five minutes to come 
to a decision about your proposal. If you made your decision about the amount which you 
like  to  propose  to  person  B,  put  the  respective  amount  into  the  envelope  and  put  the 
envelope into the box next to your cubicle. 
Game 3 (in addition): Indicate your pseudonym on the second note and put the note into 
the envelope, as well. 
Then you may pocket the amount you have allocated to yourself right away. Do not talk to 
the other people in your room until your session is completed. Do not be concerned if other 
people make their decision before you. 
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Appendix B:   A Numerical Example of the Utility Based Approach 
in the Dictator game with an uninformed recipient 
In  this  numerical  example  it  is  assumed  that  there  is  only  one  type,  i.e. 
. 0 ~ ~
2 1 2 1 = = = = s s s s 4; a = b = 2 and ps=1, pL=10 complete the assumptions. 





















































2  of the pie and would offer  3
1  to the recipient. The 





Under incomplete information the same dictator, if endowed with a large pie, may realize a 
higher utility if he pretends to have a small pie by offering  3 / 2 s p x = . Because there is only 
one type (s1 = 0.4) the dictator cannot offer any other amount without indicating that he is 





Note that the recipient anticipates the dictator’s strategy and thus sets  a a b = =
'   and    0 .  
For small a , for example  1 . 0 = a , such a strategy does no longer pay. On the other hand, 
dictators would not decide for a pure strategy  3 / 2 L p x =  because, then,  1   implies    1
' = = a b  
which would make cheating completely profitable. Instead, a fraction  b  of dictators choose 
the  strategy  x2  =  pL/3.  This fraction  is  so  large that  the  choice of  x2  = pL/3  provides  the 
dictators with the same utility as x2 = ps/3. For  1 . 0 = a , this fraction b  must be 0.95 which is 
plausible because of the small a priori probability a .   29 
Appendix C:   Probability Updating of the Recipient about the size 
of  the  pie  in  the  Dictator  Game  with  Incomplete 
Information 
 
With respect to the fraction  b - 1 of dictators who received a large pie and who may decide 
for  a  transfer  of  2 / 2 S p x £ ,  it  is  assumed  that  the  recipient,  when  ‘calculating’  her utility 
merely considers the fact that the amount is  2 / 2 S p x £ , i.e. she does not take into account 
the exact proposal of  2 x . In this case the recipient will update the probability that the dictator 









Thus, by giving  2 / 0 2 s p x £ £ , the dictator makes the recipient expect  
(26)  ( ) L s p p p E 1 '
2 1 a a - + =  
(27)  ( )




1 1 ' '
2 a a - + × =  









L s p p p
E a a - + × =  
(29)  [ ] dictators   of   types   all / 1
'
1 2 s E s E a =  
        ( ) [ ] L 1
' p uncover  not    do    who types / 1 s E a - +  













1 ' 1 ' 1











(25) - (30) may serve to compute U1 for x2 = ps/2. In order to determine the optimal decision 
of a dictator provided with pL in a dictator/recipient relationship with the described simple 
updating process, we have to compare the value of U1 under the reduced transfer with U1 for 
the optimal x2 from (8). 
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Appendix D:   On the subgame perfect equilibrium of the Impunity 
game 
After the dictator has chosen x2 and the recipient 
'
2 x  = 0 or x2 consistent expectations are 
formed. The recipient takes into account (22) and the dictator (23) leading 
(31)  ( ) 2 1 2 1
1
1 1 2
~ U E x s
p
x






- + =  

















2 2 1 U E x s
p
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b x U E  
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x s  
Solving (31) and (32) for E1U2 and E2U1, we get 
(34) 
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(35) 
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U E  
Substituting E2U1 in (23) by (35) leads to U2.  




2 = = x x  depending on which decision leads to 
the higher utility. For given x2,  ( ) 2 2
~ x s , and  ( ) 2 2 ˆ x s , the decision depends on s2. For large 
enough  0    x ,
'
2 2 = s  and for small enough s2  2
'
2 x x =  are optimal. Thus, there is a crucial 
*
2 s  
which  describes  the  borderline  between  acceptance  and  rejection  of  the  offer  ( 1
*
2 = s   is 
possible).  However,  each 
*
2 s   determines  2
~ s   and  2 ˆ s   leading  to  a  difficult  computation  of 
( ) 1
*
2 x s . We  have  to find  the 
*
2 s   which, for  given  x2,  equates  U2( ) 0
'
2 = x   and  U2( ) 2
'
2 x x =    31 
where  2 2 s ˆ   and   ~ s  are determined as the expectation values under the condition that 
*
2 2 s s >  or 
*
2 2 s s < .
20 
Lemma 1: Let F(s2) be a continuous distribution function on [0,1]. Then there is always at 
least one  ( ) 2
*
2 x s , connected with 






















2 = = > s F x s F  
(37)  ! ( )
( )






















2 = = < s F x s F , 
so that it is optimal for all types of recipients  ( ) 2
*
2 2 x s s >  to reject the offer and for all types of 
recipients  ( ) 2
*
2 2 x s s <  to accept the offer. 









>  provided) because 
both persons have altruistic feelings for each other. However, it does not pay for the recipient 
to reject the transfer, even if s2 is slightly larger than 
p
x2  because the second term in (23) is 
rather small so that the reduction of 
'
2 x  from x2 to 0 dominates. 
Increasing 
*
2 s  from 
p
x2  to larger values is accompanied by increasing  2
~ s  and increasing 
2 2
~ ˆ s s > .  Thus  (35)  implies  that  E2U1  decreases  for  2
'
2 x x =   and  even  more  for  0
'








-  has lower (negative) values. It may happen that  ( ) 2
'
2 2 x x U =  is larger than 
( ) 0
'
2 2 = x U  for all  1
*
2 < s , leading to  ( ) ( ) ( )= = = 2 2 2 2 2
*
2 s ~    , 1 s ˆ    , 1 x x x s unconditional expectation. 
On the other hand, having defined  2
~ s  and  2 ˆ s  by (36) and (37), when s2 is increased, there 
might  be  an 
*




2 2 = = = x U x x U .  Then,  for  given 
*
2 s   and  the  corresponding 
value of  2
~ s  and  2 ˆ s , every type of recipient 
*
2 2 s s <  is better off if she accepts the offer and 
every type 
*
2 2 s s >  is better off if she rejects the offer. 
Summary: there is at least one  ( ) 2
*
2 x s  with consistent conditional expectations  ( ) 2 2
~ x s  and 
( ) 2 2 ˆ x s  such that all types  ( ) 2
*
2 2 x s s >  reject a offer x2 and all types  ( ) 2
*
2 2 x s s <  accept it. ■ 
                                                        
20 Let us assume a continuous distribution function of s2 so that we need not determine behavior for 
*
2 2 s s = . 
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Lemma 2: The “minimum solution” defined in Lemma 1  ( ) 2
*




2 = = = x U x x U  
increases with x2. 




2 = > + = x U x x U e . ■ 
Lemma 3:  ( ) 0 for x   0 2 2
*
2 ® ® x s  
Proof:  Because  of  Lemma  2,  ( ) 2
*
2 x s   will  converge  to  a  certain  value 
o
2 s   which  is 
accompanied by  2 2
~ ˆ s s > . 




2 1 2 ® < = ® = l l x x U E x U E , and (23) implies 
that, for  0 2 ® x , the recipient is better off with  0
'
2 = x . ■ 
For the sake of simplicity, let us assume that  ( ) 2
*
2 x s  is unique, i.e. the dictator is confronted 
with a unique function  ( ) 2
*
2 x s , and let us now turn to the dictator’s problem of determining x2. 
From  ) ( 2
*
2 x s  we get the probability of rejection of an offer x2 
(38)  ( )
( )
( )






> = x s s x b  
Thus, the dictator’s ex ante expected utility from a transfer x2 is 
(39)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 2
'
2 2 1 2
'




1 1 0  x   x x U E x x U E x s
p
x






- + = b b  
where EU2 results from (34) with  2
'






2 for x   s ~ s   and    0 x x = = = . 
As Lemma 3 reveals, for small enough x2 nearly all recipients will reject the offer, i.e.  1 » b .  
Under these circumstances, the dictator is better off if he sets x1 = p, i.e. if he keeps the 
complete amount for himself. Thus, small transfers are not optimal for the dictator; he should 
either increase them, or decrease them to 0. 